International investment law is rushing to stake out the high ground of democratic theory. It has been claimed that the interests of foreign investors ordinarily will not be represented within a host state's political processes and so investors deserve heightened protection from policy decisions that adversely affect investment interests. I argue in the present article that this smuggling of democratic theory and constitutional postulates into international investment law is inapt and, as an empirical matter, inaccurate. By looking to the US origins of political process doctrine, I argue that its invocation by international investment tribunals is inapposite given the doctrine's concern with relegating ordinary economic regulation to relaxed scrutiny. Nor is reference to the European experience all that helpful -representation reinforcement review has not been a hallmark of European jurisprudence. I claim that this worry over democratic processes masks an attempt at legitimating controversial review by investment tribunals of high public-policy matters. Moreover, as empirical studies suggest, this solicitude offered to investors by political process review is mostly unwarranted as foreign corporate actors can and do shape host domestic policy.
I Introduction
Perhaps the gloomiest political theorist in the United States, Sheldon Wolin has described the appearance of democracy in the contemporary world as 'occasional and fugitive.' 1 The privatization of public authority and the reduction of citizenship to consumer citizenship and of democracy to shareholder democracy are just some of the features that have contributed to the debasement of democratic practice. These features of contemporary democracy work to suppress new forms that mediate the emergence of commonality. The potential for ordinary people to become 'political beings through the self-discovery of common concerns,' Wolin writes, is sublimated in contemporary democratic practice. 2 The regime to protect and promote foreign investment, I have argued elsewhere, 3 has contributed to this malaise. The rules and institutions that comprise the regime establish thresholds of tolerable democratic behaviour by, among other things, purporting to place limits on the redistributive capacity of states. 4 Looming large over the 'field of social vision,' they occupy the space of political possibility in much the same way as 'an army does a territory.'
5 If it is correct to claim that '[e]conomic equality is, in substantial part, a political phenomenon,' 6 then democracy's shrinking space signals a chastened ability to disturb wealth distribution beyond a prevailing status quo.
7
If the investment-rules regime has been described as contributing to 'good governance' practices, such as the promotion of transparency and respect for due process, 8 investment treaties and international investment tribunals charged with interpreting these treaties have not had a lot to say about the operation of democratic processes. 9 When a tribunal did have something to say about political speech, it was not favourably inclined towards its exercise by political actors, in circumstances exceeding the bounds of 'normal information,' going 'well beyond the ambit of normal contractual behaviour.' 10 It is significant, then, that the tribunal in Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v. Mexico 11 conscripted democratic theory into its ruling, arguing that the interests of foreign investors will not ordinarily be represented within a host state's political processes. I argue, in this article, that resort to democratic theory in Tecmed both is inapt and, as an empirical matter, inaccurate. This nod in the direction of democracy, moreover, elides the role of investment rules in suppressing democratic alternatives. As I have argued elsewhere, the operative rules and structure reveal a great deal of ambivalence, if not outright disdain, for the results of democratic processes beyond those considered normal.
12 Democratic processes are considered, for the most part, untrustworthy stewards of change.
The investment-rules regime, represented by a worldwide web of some 2,700 bilateral and regional investment treaties, 13 is designed to shield investors from substantial diminution of their investment interests. Investors are entitled to trigger dispute settlement mechanisms and seek damages for breach of investment treaties before international investment tribunals. These tribunals -made up of an elite corps of trade and investment lawyers and arbitrators 14 -are expected to interpret the treaties in accordance with the embedded preferences of international investment law. 15 Tribunal members overwhelmingly are concerned, therefore, with measuring the effects of state regulation on investors. They usually are much less concerned with the public-interest justifications offered by states in defence of measures that impair investment interests. This mode of interpretation has been labelled, in the context of expropriation claims, 'sole-effects' doctrine: determinations as to whether there has been a violation of investment disciplines are made solely with reference to the effects of measures on investors. 16 Sole-effects doctrine is contrasted with an approach that considers public-interest objectives under the rubric of 'proportionality analysis.' This is an idea familiar to many constitutional systems in the world, 17 where rights may justifiably be limited if the means used are proportionate to the ends sought. Sole-effects doctrine better captures the dominant trends in international investment law. A handful of tribunals, however, have moved to proportionality as a supplementary means of analysis. This move has likely been precipitated by legitimacy concerns, which continue to dog the investment tribunal process. 18 International investment arbitration has risen to some prominence, despite being structured on a private-law model of commercial arbitration intended to resolve disputes in camera and in an ad hoc fashion, with little or no publicity or national judicial oversight. 19 The system has attracted the ire not only of transnational movement critics 20 but even of the United States Congress. Congress authorized trade promotion authority in 2002 only on the basis that US negotiators grant to foreign investors no greater rights than those available to US citizens, fearing that investment rules were superseding the high protections afforded to property owners under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the US constitution. 21 Legitimacy troubles have been augmented by some 16 Rudolf Dolzer, 'Indirect Expropriations: New Developments? ' (2002) and gave notice to denounce at least nine bilateral investment treaties (BITS) that it considered oppressive in their terms, with little return, so to speak, in attracting new inward investment. 24 Despite the vaunted flexibility of international investment agreements, 25 some states are beginning to check out as a consequence of the regime's embedded preferences.
The Tecmed decision, 26 discussed next, captures these preferences well. This is a case where an investor sued successfully for damages by reason of Mexico's failure to renew an annual licence to run a hazardous waste facility site only a couple of years after the site was purchased by the investor. Finding that there had been an expropriation requiring the provision of compensation, the Tecmed tribunal turned to a seemingly obiter discussion of proportionality, 27 asking whether the measures adapted were 'reasonable with respect to their goals.' It was in the context of this discussion that the tribunal observed that the investor's foreign subsidiary could not have participated in the political processes that gave rise to the decision not to renew. 28 This factor, among others, helped to defeat claims about the legitimacy of Mexico's decision, underscoring the decision's expropriatory nature. The tribunal's reasoning invokes principles familiar to students of US constitutional law. That doctrine makes no appearance in the decision, however. Instead, the arbitrators looked to a decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in James. 29 The ECHR surmised, in the context of a taking of property at less than market value, that nonnationals are more vulnerable to the whims of legislative majorities than are nationals. Foreigners will not have had a hand in the election of the parliamentarians who authored the legislation nor will they have been consulted about its adoption, the ECHR observed.
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This resort by an investment tribunal to the 'high ground of democratic theory' is significant. 31 The tribunal invoked reasons that, as in national constitutional settings, tend to legitimate the power to negative governmental decision making. Symbolically, this suggests that investment tribunals stand in a situation similar to that of national high courts. Substantively, it underscores the degree to which the investment-rules regime mimics the constitutional constraints of particularistic national legal systems.
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In this article, I inquire into the incorporation of democratic theory and constitutional postulates into international investment law. By looking to the US origins of political-process doctrine (or representation-reinforcement review), I argue that its invocation by the Tecmed tribunal is inapposite given the doctrine's concern with relegating ordinary economic regulation to relaxed scrutiny. Nor is reference to the European experience all that helpful -representation-reinforcement review has not been a hallmark of European jurisprudence, nor has the ECHR been all that interested in deprivations of foreign wealth. 33 We might, instead, understand this worry over democratic processes as an attempt to legitimate controversial review by investment tribunals of high public-policy matters. 34 Moreover, this solicitude offered to investors by political-process review mostly is unwarranted. The corporate political activity and business risk literature suggests that foreign corporate actors can and do shape host domestic policy. Indeed, not only is corporate political power present and pervasive in most every part of the world, 35 corporate power distorts political processes in ways that undermine democracy's rationales.
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I move, first, to a fuller discussion of the Tecmed tribunal decision and its resort to political-process doctrine (Part II) and then to the place of European law in the tribunal's formulation (Part III). I turn next to a discussion of customary international law (Part IV) and then to politicalprocess doctrine as understood in US constitutional law (Parts v and VI). The empirical evidence shores up the article (Part VII), revealing the degree to which business political activity can be expected to play a role within the processes of operative democracies all over the world.
I must confess that there is some superficial appeal to Tecmed's embrace of political-process formulations. In a highly integrated world, it is enticing to think that democratic processes could be improved so that the interests of those affected by decision making within national borders are taken into account. 37 It is especially appealing for those who are rendered vulnerable by national and transnational processes of economic integration.
38 I argue, here, that this is a harder case to make in the instance of foreign investors, who can in no way be considered equivalent to vulnerable persons unaccounted for in contemporary democratic processes. II 
The Tecmed Dispute
The Tecmed dispute arose under a Spain -Mexico BIT and concerned a failure to renew a permit to operate the Cytrar hazardous waste-facility site situated thirteen kilometres from Hermosillo, the capital of the state of Sonora. The Madrid-based company Técnicas Medioambientales S.A. (Tecmed) had purchased the Cytrar site at auction in the expectation that it would continue to operate the facility under its newly formed Mexican subsidiary. 39 The facility operated for almost two years (from 1996 to 1998) mostly without incident. Civil society opposition began to mobilize against Cytrar, however, once reports began circulating that a truck driver had developed a burn on his leg after coming into contact with soil contaminated with toxic waste destined for the site. Subsequent observation at the site revealed an open toxic dump with waste lying exposed and uncontained. 40 It was also revealed that Cytrar had accepted landfill and contaminated soil from the Alco Pacifico plant near Tijuana. Alco Pacifico was a US-owned facility that had previously been shut down by federal authorities for violating Mexican federal environmental law. 41 Hermosillo-based activists first obtained a court ruling to prohibit the importation of waste from outside of the state of Sonora. As the order was ignored and not enforced, a coalition of civil society forces took direct action and blocked the entrance to the Cytrar site for 37 days in January and February 1998. The numbers blockading the site rose to approximately 300 persons, until they were forcibly dislocated by over one-hundred police officers. 45 This precipitated the filing of human rights commission complaints and a further blockade, thwarted by the police, in April 1998. 46 Setting up their headquarters in the main square in Hermosillo, over the course of 192 days, activists secured the signatures of over thirty thousand to a petition opposing the operation of the site. Hundreds also attended rallies and marches. Civil society opposition was fuelled by a Mexican federal law requiring that hazardous waste dumps be located at least twenty-five kilometres from any municipality. The Cytrar site, about thirteen kilometres (eight miles) from Hermosillo, appeared to be in violation of federal law. The law was enacted, however, after Tecmed purchased the site and obtained its licence. The law was in force when the application for annual renewal came before Mexican federal authorities. This was not, however, the purported ground for refusal of renewal of the permit; rather, the Mexican federal authorities relied on a variety of other transgressions, including exceeding landfill limits and unauthorized storage of liquid and biological infectious waste. 48 The investment tribunal acknowledged that opposition to the landfill was 'widespread and aggressive.' 49 Yet, the tribunal continued, '[H]owever intense, aggressive and sustained,' it was not 'in any way massive or went any further than the positions assumed by some individuals or the members of some groups that were opposed to the landfill.'
50 ' [O]nly two hundred to four hundred people,' the tribunal observed, 'out of a population of almost one million, participated in demonstrations.' 51 In which case, the intensity of local opposition to the site could be disregarded by the tribunal -it simply provided no excuse for the government's actions. Even if Cytrar had been guilty of a number of environmental transgressions in transporting waste from the site in Baja, these transgressions 'never compromised the ecological balance,' the tribunal concluded, and were not the real reason for the failure to renew. 52 Rather, there were 'socio-political' reasons, having to do with the proximity of the site to the local municipality.
53 By separating out public-health concerns from socio-political motivations, the tribunal could shield itself from accusations that it had thwarted legitimate environmental or public-health regulation. It is important to emphasize, here, that the tribunal did not find that there was a discriminatory intent behind the Mexican federal government's decision. 54 The decision was not intended to target foreign-owned wealth and so should not have given rise to any concerns that the measures were intended to penalize non-nationals. 55 One is left wondering, however, what otherwise would have precipitated vociferous local opposition to the site, which could only be viewed, then, as arbitrary and irrational.
The investor principally claimed that this was a compensable event tantamount to expropriation and that there was a denial of fair and equitable treatment. For our purposes, we need only focus on the first claim (though the second claim also was successful 56 ). Regulatory takings fall within the terms of the treaty as a sub-set of indirect de facto expropriations. These will be measures which are 'irreversible and permanent, and if the asset or rights subject to such measures have been affected in such a way that ". . . any form of exploitation thereof . . ." has disappeared; i.e. the economic value of the use, enjoyment or disposition of the assets or rights affected by the administrative action or decision have been neutralized or destroyed,' then there will have been a taking requiring the payment of compensation. 57 Even where measures are 'beneficial to society as a whole -such as environmental protection,' the obligation to pay compensation remains. 58 The 'government's intention,' the tribunal wrote, 'is less important than the effects of the measure' on the investor. 59 In this instance, the government's actions 'fully and irrevocably destroyed' the investment and so amounted to an expropriation. 60 Here seemed to be yet another instance in which the sole-effects doctrine was the overriding consideration.
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The tribunal was not content with examining only the effects of a measure on an investor or investment. Seemingly, in obiter, the tribunal sought to determine whether such a measure was proportional in its effects in light of the government's objective. This should have had the effect of mitigating an emphasis solely on the impact of a measure on an investor. Yet even here, the tribunal admitted, 'the significance of such [an] impact has a key role' in determining whether there 55 See discussion in Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) at 470 [Franck] . 56 The tribunal also found that there was a denial of fair and equitable treatment due to the 'lack of transparency' and 'ambiguity and uncertainty' about the future of the investment. This was conduct that upset the investor's legitimate expectations and so amounted to another ground for compensation: Tecmed, supra note 11 at paras. has been proportionality. 62 Though investor impact may have a role to play in proportionality analysis, here, sole-effects doctrine does double duty.
The question, as framed by the tribunal, was 'whether such measures are reasonable with respect to their goals, the deprivation of economic rights and the legitimate expectations of who suffered such deprivation [sic] .' 63 Though having already found the measure to be a taking, the analysis began with the 'due deference' that is owed to the state when it takes measures in the public interest. Among the factors to be considered in assessing proportionality, the tribunal added, was the 'size of the ownership deprivation' and whether compensation was offered.
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Also weighing into the tribunal's proportionality analysis was 'that the foreign investor has a reduced or nil participation in the taking of the decisions that affect it, partly because investors are not entitle[d] to exercise political rights reserved to the nationals of the state, such as voting for the authorities that will issue the decisions that affect such investors.' 65 Here, the tribunal drew not on US constitutional law but on a ruling of the ECHR. 66 The tribunal noted that the Strasbourg Court also considered the extent to which foreign investors are disenfranchised from participating in decisions that give rise to such measures by public authority, because investors are not entitled to exercise political rights available to 'nationals of the State.' 67 It turns out that this is not a nuanced representation of what the ECHR decided in James.
III The European Model
James concerned leasehold-reform legislation in the United Kingdom requiring the Duke of Westminster, the owner of some 2 000 homes in the districts of Belgravia and Mayfair in central London, to sell his leased property at significantly reduced rates to lessees. The forced sale resulted in massive windfalls for some tenants. In dispute was the amount of compensation owed to James, which was substantially less than full value. The Court, applying its 'margin of appreciation' doctrine, required the state only to show some 'reasonable relationship of proportionality' between means (compensation provided) and ends 73 in which case, the state legitimately could provide compensation at rates less than the strict standard. The Court used similar reasoning in Lithgow, decided later that same year. 74 This second case concerned the nationalization, with compensation at less than full value, of the British aircraft and ship-building industry. On these two occasions where the Court embraced the political-process rationale, it did not do so to strike at discriminatory economic legislation; rather, it did so to shield national state measures from any greater scrutiny than was required under its margin of appreciation doctrine. This is consistent with the Court's overall stance as regards economic matters, in which 'acceptance of the member States' entitlement to regulate their respective economies is embedded in the Convention's structure.' 75 Might the same hold true in the case of alien-owned property? It is important to underscore that the ECHR, in these cases, invoked 69 James, supra note 29 at paras. 46, 50; Tom Allen, Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (Oxford: Hart, 2005) at 133 [Allen] . 70 The ECHR opinion states, 'Especially as regards a taking of property effected in the context of a social reform, there may well be good grounds for drawing a distinction between nationals and non-nationals as far as compensation is concerned. To begin with, non-nationals are more vulnerable to domestic legislation: unlike nationals, they will generally have played no part in the election or designation of its authors nor have been consulted on its adoption. Secondly, although a taking of property must always be effected in the public interest, different considerations may apply to nationals and non-nationals and there may well be legitimate reason for requiring nationals to bear a greater burden in the public interest than non-nationals'; James, supra note 29 at para. 63. In ten short pages of the Supreme Court Reports, Justice Stone for the Court upheld the congressional Filled Milk Act of 1923 as a valid enactment under the commerce clause, equal protection clause, and takings clause of the US Constitution. The Carolene company fell under the auspices of the federal law by importing 'Milnut' into southern Illinois, a cheap milk substitute that removed the milk's butter fat and replaced it with less costly coconut oil. This was an 'adulterated' food product listed under the Act that was 'injurious to the public health.'
96 That the congressional enactment was upheld is remarkable, considering that, only two years earlier, its constitutionality would have been in some doubt. 97 The Court's reversal, of course, is exemplified by Carolene Products's reasons: its structural and theoretical bases suggested in footnote 4. 98 As to the reasons, Justice Stone sustained the measure on the basis of a presumption of constitutionality and on the 'affirmative evidence' available. 99 The bill 'was adopted by Congress after committee hearings, in the course of which eminent scientists and health experts testified.' 100 'Even in the absence of such aids,' Stone continued, 'the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.' 101 Carolene Products represents, then, the effective withdrawal of run-of-the-mill economic regulation from judicial scrutiny, so long as a rational basis, which is to be presumed, exists for the legislative measure. There will be exceptions to the presumption of constitutionality, and these are described in footnote 4. First, at the insistence of Chief Justice Hughes, 102 Justice Stone's opinion admitted that there might 'be a narrower scope for the operation of the presumption in cases when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,' such as the first ten amendments. 103 Nor was it deemed necessary to consider whether legislation 'which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation' -such as measures restricting the right to vote or choking off political opposition -also would be immune to the presumption and would call for more 'exacting judicial scrutiny' under the Fourteenth Amendment. Lastly, the Court needn't inquire into whether statutes directed at religious, national, or racial minoritieswhat is described as 'prejudice against discrete and insular minorities' -call for a 'correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.' 104 The second and third paragraphs of footnote 4 represent, then, a tentatively stated theory justifying the rigour with which the court would review legislative initiatives blocking access to the political process or evincing prejudice directed at vulnerable minorities. In his elegantly framed argument in Democracy and Distrust, John Hart Ely develops Justice Stone's footnote into a full-blown theoretical justification for Warren-Court-era case law. 105 According to Ely, the US constitution is concerned almost exclusively with political process in the broad sense -'with clearing the channels of political change, on the one hand, and with correcting certain kinds of discrimination against minorities, on the other.'
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Substantive questions, Ely maintains, were left 'almost entirely to the political process' and so are not an appropriate subject for judicial review.
Reviving the discredited idea of 'virtual representation,' 107 Ely argues that the interests of those without political power -political outsidersshould, in some instances, be tied constitutionally to those with power. voteless' being entitled to virtual representation. Even the 'technically represented' might find themselves 'functionally powerless' and so in need of virtual representation. 109 The question for Ely was whether it was 'appropriate constitutionally to bind the interests of the majority to those of some minority with which no felt community of interests has naturally developed.'
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As Laurence Tribe notes, in an early review, determining those groups whose stereotyping is worthy of constitutional protection is, itself, a substantive question of constitutional law. These are, at bottom, 'judgements about the propriety of the options left to individuals or the burdens imposed on them.'
111 By this reason alone (in addition to other elements in the text of the constitution), there can be no escape from substance. 112 Ely reasons through some of these questions in his book. He admits that distinctions on the basis of alienage (or citizenship) are 'a relatively easy case.'
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Discrimination on the grounds of gender, other than for pre-1937 legislation, by contrast is not seen as warranting strict scrutiny so long as women constitute more than fifty per cent of the voting population. 114 Corporate actors would not qualify under Ely's formulation. Corporate actors do not have a vote either inside or outside of states or in Congress. 115 Their interests, Ely observes, 'generally have to be protected by persons whose interests are tied up with theirs -officers, employees, stockholders.' 116 Consumers and allied producers can also represent foreign corporate interests, 117 sometimes effectively reducing the 'deficit in participatory lawmaking.' 118 If consumer interests are considered too diffuse to countervail well-organized peak organizations, 119 then otherssuch as businesses with common interests, suppliers, and state agencies promoting inward investment -can speak presumably on behalf of investors. All of these constituencies -the corporation's principal stakeholders -are target audiences for corporate advocacy campaigns. Indeed, studies indicate that 'corporate constituency building,' where corporate stakeholders are 'organized and mobilized to express their support of, or opposition to specific public policy proposals,' has become a 'prevalent political influence tactic.' 120 There is the further possibility that foreign subsidiaries themselves will participate, directly or indirectly, in host-state deliberations that affect future profitability. The empirical evidence, discussed next, points precisely in this direction. A major problem with the Tecmed ruling, then, is the naïve way in which the tribunal invokes political-process doctrine without any inquiry into how investors may be implicated in local or national political decision making.
The more obvious difficulty is that the Tecmed tribunal invokes the political-process rationale for purposes that are at odds with the doctrine's rationale in the post-1937 universe. If its impetus was to shield regulation of markets from judicial review and to reserve strict scrutiny for measures that negatively affect discrete and insular groups, then the tribunal's approach appears to be the mirror opposite of this post-1937 rationale; unless, that is, transnational business organizations can be likened to groups discriminated against on the grounds of religion, nationality, or race. Writing in the context of 1938, Justice Stone had in mind, according to Cover, minorities that were 'isolated in the social structure,' occupying positions 'relatively resistant to change' and 'vulnerable to attack by others.' 121 Rather than bearing any resemblance to the concerns motivating Justice Stone, the of Congress, in which case, there were structural reasons and not processual ones that motivated the Marshall Court. The case does stand for the proposition, however, that 'in some situations, judicial intervention becomes appropriate when the existing processes of representation seem inadequately fitted to the representation of minority interests, even minority interests that are not voteless.' 130 Stone referred in footnote 4, in addition to McCulloch, to his contemporaneous opinion in South Carolina v. Branwell Bros.
131 There, a South Carolina ban on semi-trailer trucks on state highways was upheld by the Supreme Court as 'reasonably adapted to the end sought'; namely, the objectives of safety and the reduction of maintenance costs. 132 In Carolene Products, Stone refers specifically to footnote 2 of this decision, when he writes (again, in a tentative way) that, underlying the doctrine that no state can burden interstate commerce so as to confer an advantage on those within that state, is the thought, often expressed in judicial opinion [ probably referring here to Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch], that when regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state. 133 So, here is clear evidence linking political-process theory to early dormant-commerce-clause doctrine.
Political-process theory, however, often makes an appearance in dormant-commerce-clause literature and doctrine as a proxy for an argument from efficiency. 134 Mark Tushnet, for instance, purports to explain the result in these cases as resting upon political justifications having to do with free trade and efficiency. 135 In fact, 'once efficiency considerations are held to have constitutional status,' Tushnet writes, 'it makes little sense to confine them to dormant commerce clause' cases, and so he mischievously makes an argument for the revival of Lochner-era doctrine of substantive due process. 136 If efficiency concerns explain much of what goes on under the guise of analysis of the dormant commerce clause, the cases applying the non-discrimination principle under the rubric of the dormant commerce clause, writes Lisa Heinzerling, 'aim toward the preservation and enlargement of the commercial market, undisturbed by regulation interfering with common law rights' reminiscent of the Lochner era. 137 An efficiency rationale, however, ill suits the Tecmed tribunal's resort to political-process theory. The tribunal made no claim, explicit or implicit, that efficiency concerns were driving its analysis in the context of its discussion of proportionality. There is a sense, however, that the Tecmed tribunal was giving voice to a pre-1937 view of acquired economic rights that complements well modern efficiency rationales.
Allied to the political-process rationale is the notion that the dormant commerce clause serves the cause of national unity: the idea that economic actors operating in the United States may proceed on the basis that there is one national economy and that 'the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together.' 138 As Donald Regan strikingly puts it, 'Protectionist legislation is the economic equivalent of war. It is hostile in its essence.' 139 Although it is impermissible for states to discriminate or unduly burden commerce, it is permissible for Congress to do so as supervising national authority representing all. 140 This appeal to structure and doctrine seems, again, ill fitted to the Tecmed setting, where there was no governing democratic community -no political union analogous to the US federal government -capable of attaining some of the objectives forbidden to states by the dormant commerce clause. 141 The discussion so far has presupposed that voteless foreign investors have no voice in jurisdictions that are hosts to their investments. Such an emphasis on political processes in which voters get to register their preferences is a common feature of international law, writes Susan Marks. 142 Elections are more susceptible to easy monitoring by international observers and this has contributed to international law's penchant for 'low-intensity democracy.' 143 This is in contrast to other, more robust, forms of democratic participation in which voting is considered part of a much larger set of ongoing political practices. 144 Rather than emphasizing the episodic democracy associated with representative democracy, 145 Pierre Rosanvallon maintains that citizens in contemporary democracies exercise counter-democratic functions that serve to make politicians more accountable. 146 Citizens are pluralistic political actors, according to this account, serving as watchdogs, negativing political decisions, and judging political behaviour. The empirical data, to which I turn to next, confirm that political participation can take many different forms. 147 The data also serve to disturb the foundations of the Tecmed tribunal's emphasis on the primacy of the ballot box.
VII Corporate Political Activity
In his penetrating critique of Carolene Products, Bruce Ackerman upsets a number of assumptions associated with political-process theory. His objective is to reconstruct US constitutional doctrine by merging it with a 'welldeveloped body of pluralist political science.' 148 He pointedly remarks that Justice Stone got it wrong: the judiciary should be moved to protect 'anonymous and diffuse' groups, rather than those who are discrete and insular, for it is 'these groups that both political science and American history indicate are systematically disadvantaged in pluralist Reversing the order of priority established by Lochner, Ackerman suggests that it is those without property rights who lack 'ample opportunity to safeguard their own interests through the political process.'
151
By engaging with a well-developed body of empirical literature, my aim here is to unsettle understandings about those interests entitled to similar solicitude. The object is to document how corporate influence may be brought to bear on legislators and regulators. This data should generate some anxiety. As the pattern of experience in the United States and other mature democracies establishes, the pathologies associated with the influence of money on politics significantly disturb the possibilities for democratic practice and reform. 152 Wolin, for instance, likens unaccountable influence peddling in the United States (unaccountable, that is, except to shareholders) to a form of corruption that, when it becomes normal, 'is so widely pervasive as to be functional to the operation of a system and, at the same time, so deeply embedded as to incapacitate the system from reforming itself.'
153 Robert Reich describes corporate lobbying as having engulfed citizen politics, even destroying the possibility of politics.
154 Surveying the damage wrought by the near collapse of the financial system, Simon Johnson and James Kwak liken the political influence of Wall Street banks to that of a 'new American oligarchy' -'a group that uses economic power to gain political power, and then uses that political power for its own benefit.' 155 The data drawn on here, though hardly as egregious as those that resulted in the global financial crisis, can be read as justifying the regulation, even proscription in some cases, of corporate political behaviour as suggested by the 1975 U.N. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. 156 For the purposes, however, of this argument -to disturb the unsubstantiated claim in Tecmed that foreign investors are unrepresented in political processesit is sufficient to show (if evidence is at all needed) that corporate political activity and influence are alive and well in the contemporary world. This is an era in which states compete aggressively for scarce foreign capital. 157 Desirous of signalling to investors that they will be accorded the highest priority by the policy-making apparatus of the state, state actors have adopted a variety of signalling devices; for instance, abandoning foreign-investment screening mechanisms and regulatory measures or executing concession contracts with guaranteed rates of return. If conditions for wealthy corporate actors are favourable in the pre-establishment phase, investments are most vulnerable to political risk after their establishment, 158 as the theory of the obsolescing bargain suggests in the field of natural resources. 159 Indeed, foreign investors can be subject to discriminatory, even retaliatory, treatment by reason of national origin. Amy Chua, for instance, has documented how cycles of re-nationalization often are driven by ethnically charged targeting of foreign economic actors within. 160 State actors, in turn, are dependant upon the success of private market. 161 The generation of private wealth through markets helps to generate resources for the state both to tax and to borrow resources which partly determine political success. These are some of the 'structural mechanisms' that help to explain the continuing influence of capital on state managers despite the 'relative autonomy' of states. 162 Even in the age of corrupt lobbyists like Jack Abramoff, there is more than a simple one-to-one correspondence between the desires of capital and the actions of politicians. 163 It is precisely in that spacebetween the exercise of the franchise and the vote on the legislative floor -that representative democracy offers opportunities for the well-organized interests of the voteless to make their voices heard. 164 For these reasons, it is said that 'the best-represented interests on Capitol Hill and in state capitals are surely the interests of corporations and businesses that are not even eligible to vote.' 165 The empirical evidence within the United States, unsurprisingly, indicates that corporate actors will endeavour to effect political change. 166 Adopting the premise of profit maximization as an explanation for corporate political activity, 167 studies reveal that corporations making their home within the United States use political activity to modify costly regulations or to secure government contracts. 168 Businesses are likely to use a variety of means to achieve these political ends, including contributing to political action committees (PACS), lobbying, corporate constituency building, and charitable giving. Foreign firms operating within the United States, however, are less likely to engage in visible political activity, have fewer PACS, 169 and also give less to charity. 170 Although they are likely to lobby less than home firms do, lobbying is more common among foreign firms than are other political activities because lobbying has low visibility. 171 Foreign firms, in other words, do not want to appear to be participating or interfering in democratic processes within host states.
172 This is even the case for Canadianowned foreign firms, those that might be considered the 'least foreign' of foreign firms.
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Foreign corporate actors will, for the most part, follow host-state political practice and so seek to influence political decision making via backdoor channels. The corruption conviction against Representative Bob Ney (related to influence peddling by lobbyist Jack Abramoff ) exposed the outer limits of this sort of activity. Ney admitted to accepting thousands of dollars worth of gambling chips in exchange for assisting the owner of a Cyprus-based aviation company in obtaining a visa and for easing American restrictions on the sale of airplanes and airplane parts from Iran. 174 We can assume that, even without pay-offs in poker chips, in operative (even dysfunctional) representative democracies, foreignbased corporate actors will get their voices heard.
Other factors, coming out of the political-risk literature, 175 help to explain business success and failure in shaping host domestic policy. There are factors, many of them internal to foreign subsidiaries, that help to mitigate investor vulnerability to political risk. Data drawn from a study by Thomas Poynter of the experience of managers of foreign multinationals in Tanzania, Zambia, Indonesia, and Kenya in the 1970s suggest that the more complex the managerial and operational tasks undertaken by the foreign firm (making it more difficult for host states to take over via nationalization or indigenization), the larger the volume of sales to associated firms, the more intense the volume of exports, the greater the proportion of foreigners in managerial and technical positions (they are 169 less easy to replace), then the greater the foreign-firm bargaining power vis-à-vis the host government. 176 Poynter adds that, according to his data set, the more 'politically aggressive firms' experienced significantly less governmental intervention in their operations. The more frequent the contacts between the subsidiary and government, in other words, the less likely government would be to intervene negatively in the firm's operations. 177 Also determinative of firm bargaining power is the intensity of competition faced by a foreign subsidiary 178 and the number of 'firmspecific resources that are hard to copy.' 179 Bargaining power will likely erode over time to the extent that firm-specific resources can be 'easily imitated' or there are 'strategically equivalent substitutes.' 180 How well does this experience translate to emerging or new democracies in the contemporary global South? Extrapolating from the work of Hansen et al., 181 it is reasonable to assume that foreign corporate actors also will engage in political activity within these states. Premised upon the standard model of corporate profit maximization, the incentives to participate will be the same for both domestic and foreign corporations. 182 Foreign firms also can be expected to adopt political practices viewed as legitimate within the host-country political context. Japanese and British firms, according to a small sample of 1988 US data, were likely to spread political contributions to incumbents in both parties in much less partisan ways than they might have done at home. 183 The point is that 'corporate political strategies converge' around practices common within the host-state context -that foreign entities do not 'carry their home practices abroad.' 184 Despite the rhetoric about obsolescing bargains, the data reveal that foreign investors have a wide variety of mechanisms available to ameliorate political risk and engage in extensive lobbying, either alone or in coalitions. Resisting the notion that investors have only one shot at bargaining with host states, in a study testing investor influence in twenty-five transition states, Edmund Malesky found that 'coalitions of investors do indeed lobby for political change and often have significant impact on the economic trajectory of their host countries.' 185 Relying on survey data of some 4 000 firms operating abroad in 48 countries in 1999 -2000, Rodolphe Desbordes and Julien Vauday conclude that foreign and domestic firms share the same degree of political influence and that, given concessions that may have been obtained upon entry, advantages enjoyed by foreign firms over domestic ones do not obsolesce over time. 186 They conclude that 'the bargaining power of foreign firms is generally high enough to outweigh any political liability of foreignness.' 187 We can provisionally conclude, then, that foreign corporate actors within host states with operative representative democracies would not be voiceless and even would be 'represented' in ways similar to those of nationally based corporate actors. They might elect, however, to pursue less visible forms of political action for fear of being seen as illegitimately influencing national or local politics.
It also could be that resort to extra-national legal fora has the effect of draining host states of efforts to make their political-and legal-decisionmaking apparatus more responsive to what might be called fairness claims by foreign investors. 188 Instead of a reliance on transnational legal resources, an emphasis on host-state reforms could generate greater interest in ordinary reforms that benefit citizens and investors alike. Ronald Daniels hypothesizes that generating legal enclaves for foreign investors 'siphons off the investor voice from the enterprise of creating good and generalized rule of law institutions' in the host country. 189 In his study using governance indicators reported by the World Bank, Tom Ginsburg produces suggestive evidence that BIT adoption leads to subsequent declines in rule-of-law variables. 190 He hypothesizes that, without the incentive effects of adjudicating investorstate disputes, which could improve local judicial decision-making quality, international alternatives 'may perpetuate poor domestic institutions by allowing powerful actors to exit.' 191 Investors not only become uninterested in host-state legal developments; they demand contractual concessions from host states that are likely 'to limit the state's capacity to respond to legitimate public policy concerns through the creation of credible, transparent and participatory regulatory institutions. ' 192 This sort of behaviour, Albert Hirschman observes, damages 'the capacity of a state to achieve meaningful consensus about needed reforms.' 193 So as to illustrate the point, Daniels points to public-infrastructure concession contracts that have given rise to vociferous opposition by local national publics and to subsequent investor-state disputes. Contracts typically are non-transparent commitments for a lengthy term of years, lack public legitimacy, and freeze regulatory regimes, possibly at the expense of socially desirable regulatory changes. 194 power by keeping the host government apprised of the parent firm's contribution to the subsidiary (as in the case of technology transfers) and future plans for growth. Initiating contacts with government enabled firms to identify the sponsors of interventionist measures and to ascertain the extent to which government intended to redirect policy. 196 This is the sort of political behaviour, Poynter adds, 'familiar to domestic and state enterprises in most LDCs and, of course, present in the majority of developed countries as well.'
197 It may be the case, as the empirical research suggests, that foreign firms will want to adopt a less visible role in states than do home-based firms. Nevertheless, as these studies also suggest, there is still much that foreign firms do to alleviate what might be considered adverse political decision making. Yadong Luo, for instance, maintains that a more cooperative orientation toward the host state reduces political risk. 198 Data from a 1998 survey of senior managers of 131 foreign firms operating in China reveal that, in situations where firms contribute distinctive resources, maintain strong personal relations with government officials, develop credibility and trustworthiness, and accommodate the social needs of the host country, MNC -host government relations are improved. This logic of political accommodation is premised on the idea that the 'bargaining position of firms can be best safeguarded if their business interests accommodate rather than neglect or dominate public interests in host nations.' 'From the host government viewpoint,' Luo writes, 'an MNC's political accommodation shows its commitment to the host society. High accommodation mitigates the liability of foreignness as perceived by officials and amplifies the firm's credibility and legitimacy as perceived by the public.' 199 In short, corporate political actors who are attentive to local needs are more likely to thrive economically (admittedly, without guaranteed high rates of return) while simultaneously promoting the interests of local political 196 communities. 200 This is not to say that we should expect transnational business operatives to gain a 'corporate conscience' 201 or become 'agents of justice.' 202 Rather, it is to underscore that transnational business enterprises are deploying these resources in myriad jurisdictions around the world and so are not in need of international investment law's helping hand. VIII 
Conclusion
It turns out that the Tecmed tribunal's recourse to the high ground of democratic theory was ill founded, at least in the case of foreign investors. Whatever the precise origins of political-process doctrine, we should understand this scramble to higher ground as an attempt to resolve some of the nagging legitimacy concerns that have arisen in regard to international investment law more generally. 203 It also serves to elide the nexus between robust democratic practice and the suppression of alternatives promoted by the investment-rules regime.
Treating foreign corporate actors as if they were enfranchised citizens turns out, then, to be the wrong analogy. As the empirical studies reveal, foreign corporate actors should, instead, be likened to host-state corporate actors in operative democracies who, ipso facto, do not have the right to vote but who nevertheless participate, and do influence, political processes. The question that remains is whether the political-process concerns of international investment tribunals can be redirected to those more worthy of their solicitude -to the propertyless rather than the propertied. Then, it could be said that the regime was serving the cause of democracy.
